I believe we will go ahead and begin. Thank

you all for coming.

I have been chairman of this Subcommittee on East Asian and

Pacific Affairs for almost 4 years now. During that time, the subcommittee

has held more meetings on North Korea than any other

single country, other than China. In fact, our last hearing was on

North Korea.

In that time, I guess I could say that I continue to be amazed

and concerned by the unpredictable and unbalanced nature of the

regime in Pyongyang. Despite widespread starvation and disease,

the government continues to adhere the very economic policies that

have led to this condition in the first place. Despite worldwide repudiation

of communism, the government continues to revolve

around a Stalinist cult of personality, devoted to Kim Jong-il. Despite

international norms and conventions, the DPRK continues to

sell nuclear and conventional missile technology to rogue nations

such as Iraq and Libya, in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty.

In spite of the terms of the agreed nuclear framework with the

United States, there continues in North Korea to be developed a

program aimed at producing nuclear materials, or at least that is

apparently the case. Every month brings a new surprise. This

month has been no exception. On the 31st of August, North Korea

fired a two-stage missile through Japanese airspace. Although uncertain

at first, I understand now that NASA believes the launch

placed a satellite, albeit apparently a nonfunctional one, into orbit.

But it seems to me that there are additional motives for the

launch. First, it was certainly to impress potential weapons buyers

by forcefully announcing the availability of a new product. Second,

it was meant to underscore the elevation of Kim Jong-il to his newest

post and the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the founding

of the DPRK. Finally, to up the ante on its outgoing Four Party

Talks and the KEDO negotiations.

Whatever the intention, its effects on many in Congress, including

myself, have been to undermine our already reticent support

for the present negotiation process with the DPRK. I have been a

supporter, although somewhat begrudging at times, of the Agreed

Framework since its inception. The agreement was far from perfect,

of course. I supported it because I believed it was an end to

our own best interests and the best interests of East Asia. I supported

it through its fits and starts—supported it when the North

diverted oil deliveries to the military, and supported it when the

North showed signs of restarting their nuclear program. I supported

it because, on the whole, the North Korean movement forward

in the Four Party Talks and cooperation in the nuclear area

outweighed the North’s traditional tendency to push the envelope

with us.

When North Korea fired off its missile, however, and when our

intelligence community revealed that the North has been engaged

in both propulsion tests and construction of a large, underground

facility, it makes it difficult to continue to have that kind of support.

These acts should drive home the fact to us that the North’s

signature on bilateral and international weapons and nuclear

agreements is little better than the paper it is printed on. It should

also cause us to give serious consideration to examining alternative

ways to dealing with the North, since the efficacy of our present

system seems highly questionable.

I called this meeting today to examine the recent developments

in Korea. I also called it because I, and I think others, have considerable

reservations about our ability to deal with the proliferation

crisis at this time. I will not surprise my colleagues when I say

that the phrase ‘‘Clinton foreign policy’’ is an oxymoron. And this

is not a partisan viewpoint. I have heard it shared by many of my

Democrat colleagues. We are not showing the kind of well-planned,

thoughtful leadership in East Asia that is required there.

The possible consequence of failing foreign policy in this case,

though it is far more serious than the simply collapse of KEDO,

would be the disastrous consequences for us and our allies in the

entire East Asia region. I hope that we can be convinced that adherence

to the present Agreed Framework and continued negotiations

with the North continues to be in the best interest of the

United States and of South Korea and our Japanese allies. Otherwise,

as I mentioned on the floor of the Senate last week, support

for this process will evaporate, and quite quickly, in the future.

So we welcome you here and we want to hear your comments.

Senator Robb.

Thank you, sir.

I want to go back in the questioning to the missile and what your

feeling is there, but maybe even more timely, I have before me here

a statement from the spokesman at the State Department in terms

of these talks. It says in the first paragraphs: Negotiators have obtained

commitments from their North Korean counterparts on a

range of major issues. Then, as you read down, the first one: has

agreed to continue serious discussion. The second one: has agreed

to resume missile talks. The third one: has agreed to Four Party

Talks.

The fourth one—well, the point is it sounds like, then, these

agreements which are lauded as being commitments are in fact decisions

to talk further. Now we have been talking since 1953. And

so you begin to wonder what does this really mean? What does this

agreement amount to, more talks?

Ambassador Kartman?

Well, I do not think anybody would argue that

it is necessary to have talks. And that is a valuable step forward,

particularly with a country like Korea. I guess the basic question,

however, is, after years of this, of talking, and yet continuing to

have what we think are breaches of what we talked about, do we

continue to give them heavy oil? Do we continue to have light

water reactors? Do we continue to send food? Do you continue to

do all these things, and the talks go on, but the people do not do

anything about what you have talked about in the talks?

Now, is that not the basic bottom line?

I am sure. However, I think even though obviously

this was not a treaty and did not require congressional approval,

at least in there was the notion that the North Koreans

would halt operations in infrastructure of its nuclear program. Are

we assured that has happened? I do not think so.

Sure.

Our what?

I guess in my final question—and I am sure

there is no answer—we have an army there, a division or whatever,

37,000 men and women, we are stronger, our relationships

are better with the ROK, but North Korea continues to do these

things. So, do you all say to yourself, OK, so you have got your

muscles there, you are tougher than anybody else, but you are not

doing anything about it? They are continuing to sort of thumb their

nose at you. How do you respond to that?

With their submarines and missiles and so on,

they apparently are not very concerned that you are going to use

that force.

Thank you.

Notwithstanding, the Secretary of State told the Congress it

would never be more than $30 million a year?

Fuel oil prices are about at the lowest they

have been in history.

The most difficult one may be Japan’s reluctance

now to put the $3 billion or $4 billion that they were committed

to. They have indicated that a second launch would be totally

unacceptable. What does that mean?

I suspect you have inquired, however, have you

not?

It seems to me that overall in this discussion

about the framework and so on is the real question of whether or

not the framework is an overall policy with respect to North Korea

or whether it is sort of peripheral thing having to do with energy

and having to do with replacing the light water reactor, something

they were generating otherwise. But is it considered to be in Defense,

is it considered to be in the State Department, is this our

policy? Or is this a segment dealing with one portion?

For instance, this one certainly has not completed. Part of it was

to open up all kinds of trade agreements and reduce trade barriers

and have all kinds of credit cards being used. None of that has

happened as far as I know.

I guess my basic question is, is the framework agreement our

basic policy or is that a policy here when there is a need for a

broader policy for the whole operation?

Dr. Campbell, when this missile went off a few

days ago, at least in the press the State Department was surprised.

The Defense Department said they were not; they knew it was

going to happen. I do not understand that.

The Secretary of State was quoted as saying

that. Now I guess that does not mean she said it necessarily.

We were not surprised at a staged missile?

Have you ever found the satellite?

You did not hear the song on the airwaves?

We are going to have to get you a high-tech

radio.

So you may have been surprised that they did

it, but you were not surprised that they had the capacity to do it?

Thank you, sir.

I guess I do not quite understand what you would suggest the

administration policy is.

Well, you said you think they are on the right

path. And I am saying, where is the path leading? We have this

agreement, the framework agreement. Beyond that, what are we

doing? Are we going to bargain with food aid? Are we going to just

continue to have our forces there to stand them off? I do not understand

why you think that we are on the right path?

But this was my question to the others and

now I guess I should say it to you, is the framework a policy? And

the answer was no, it is a partial policy. We have a framework policy,

but we are not sure, for example, what has happened to the

existing rods. Maybe they will be canned. What happens to them?

We are not certain as to what has happened to the dismantling of

reactors and so on. We have not had a reduction of barriers to

trade as was suggested when we set up this framework. We have

the fifth largest military in the world, the largest per capita military.

We have moved more military weapons up to the DMZ.

Now, is the framework agreement dealing with all of those

things?

Then what is?

Right.

But let me interrupt. You and I have already

agreed, as have the others, that that is only part of the question.

And we are faced with the rest of it.

We are absent a policy is what I am saying to

you.

Well, that is very useful conversation. But the

fact is, for those of us that watched this happen, we have had these

talks, we have had these negotiations, we have had promises, we

have had signed agreements, and yet these other things—proliferation

of nuclear weapons, missiles—continues to go on. So what do

you do, just say, well, we want to continue to talk?

But a wait a minute. Use of force is not the

only option. We continue to do lots of other things, as well.

As if they were complying with everything that

we asked them to do. And they are not. And it is hard for me to

understand that.

Senator Robb.

Now, I would not want you to agree with him

entirely.

Yes, you are welcome.

Thank you, Ambassador. I know you need to leave. It is interesting,

though, the amount of stress and strain that goes on. Here is

a country the size of Mississippi, with 20 million people, surrounded

by China, South Korea, Russia, all pretty much combined

in their efforts to do something. On the other hand, you have Iraq

and you have Libya, little countries that seem to—and we have

based 37,000 armed services people there, plus we just shipped

some more stuff over there, and you wonder sometimes if that is

where we ought to be focusing as much attention as we do.

And you mentioned Iraq. It seems to me the same thing is true

with Iraq. And you are something of an expert. We have just been

going through this idea that we were going to—the agreement was

that we would have inspections. But when they say no, you cannot

do that, then what do we do? We just kind of back away from it.

How long do you do that?